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Abstract
We consider an experiment where we use the Taylor rule in-
formation set, in°ation and the output gap, to predict the next
change in monetary policy for the United Kingdom 1992 - 2000.
To do this we use a limited dependent variable approach, where
thenext ratechangecould be`upwards', `downwards' or`nochange'.
A Multinomial Logit model is used to predict thenext most likely
changeusing monthly data, and thesepredictions are compared to
the actual outturn. Against this hypothesis we compare a wider
information set including morethan just in°ation and output gap
variables. The in-sample and out-of-sample prediction tests are
evaluated using forecast performance tests. Although the Taylor
rule is a useful summary for monetary policymakers, the informa-
tion from in°ation and the output gap is insu±cient to predict
the direction of the next change compared to a wider information
set, but theusefulness of any ruleasan ex ante guideto monetary
policymaking is questioned relative to an intelligent committee of
policymakers using their own judgment.1 Introduction
The Taylor rule has emerged as a simple but robust estimate of the rela-
tionship between the monetary policy instrument, a short term interest
rate, and measures of in°ation and the deviation of output from its trend
value. The rule satis¯es all the criteria for a simple rule of thumb. It
depends on variables that are easily measured and available in a timely
fashion, the rule itself can be readily estimated by econometric methods;
it is also capable of explaining the past history of the monetary policy
instrument in many of the industrialized countries and o®ers clear and
simple guidance to policymakers concerning which of the components
of the rule is driving the monetary policy instrument.Taylor (1993) has
shown that this rule, with coe±cients of 1.5 on in°ation and 0.5 on the
output gap, can explain US monetary policy from 1986 very well. It
has been suggested by Ball (1997) and Svensson (1997) that `optimal
weights' chosen to minimize the variance of in°ation and output might
be higher than these values. Although recent evidence in Taylor (1999,
2000, 2001) suggests that small improvements can be achieved by intro-
ducing forward-looking measures of in°ation (Batini et al, 2000), and the
exchange rate to re°ect the openness of the economy (Svensson, 2000,
2001), but the gains over the simple Taylor rule are minor.
These results havebeenexamined for awiderset ofcountries. Clar-
ida et al (1998) estimate the forward looking Taylor rule for the G3 (US,
Japan, Germany) and the E3 (UK, France and Italy) using the general-
ized method of moments over a sample beginning in 1979 and ending in
the early 1990s for the G3 and prior to the `hard' ERM for the E3. The
results for the G3 imply that all three countries respond aggressively to
in°ation, since the estimates of the coe±cients on in°ation are signi¯-
cantly greater than unity, but mildly towards output gaps. The E3 on
the other hand have coe±cient on in°ation estimated below unity or in-
signi¯cantly di®erent from unity, suggesting that they had policy rules
during this period that were dissimilar to those of the G3. E3 countries
appeared to be following disin°ation strategies which did not approxi-
mate to forward looking Taylor rules. More recent evidence for the UK
1in Nelson (2000) implies that the response of the UK nominal rate to
in°ation and output gap are very close to the values of 1.5 and 0.5 pro-
posed by Taylor (1993) for the in°ation targeting period 1992-1997 (the
range of his sample did not extend beyond 1997).
The Taylor rule provides a goodsummary ofcentral bank behaviour
under the new monetary policy consensus. However, explaining the past
is not the same as predicting the future. We might still ask: Does the
Taylor rule o®er a good guide to future monetary policy? Mervyn King
has observed that the Taylor rule embodies common sense and therefore
`central banks that have been successful appear ex post to have been
following a Taylor rule even if they had never heard of that concept
when they were actually making decisions' press brie¯ng 10 February
1999 [our emphasis]. Although the rule is a good ex post summary of
successful central bank behavior, we might still ask whether it would be
useful as an ex ante guide to policymakers.
We begin by re-examining the evidence on Taylor rules. The cur-
rent evidence is largely based on quarterly data, but monetary policy
decisons are made more frequently than once a quarter. The question
is whether the evidence, and we will consider the United Kingdom, sup-
ports the Taylor rule at the higher frequency required for monthly deci-
sion making. We then consider an experiment in which the Taylor rule
information set - in°ation and the output gap - are used to predict the
next change in monetary policy. To do this we use a limited depen-
dent variable approach, where the next rate change could be `upwards',
`downwards' or `no change'1. A Multinomial Logit model is used to
predict the next most likely change using monthly data, and these pre-
dictions are compared to the actual outturn. Against this hypothesis
we compare a wider information set including more than just in°ation
and output gap variables, and assess the ability of the wider informa-
tion set to predict against the actual outturn. Finally, we conduct an
out-of-sample prediction tests with a test of association in contingency
1With the exception of a few large reductions in the base rate immediately after
the UK exit from the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) all the rate changes have
been conducted in steps of 25 basis points on a monthly frequency.
2tables (Newbold, 1995). If the Taylor rule is a good guide to monetary
policymakers the information from in°ation and the output gap should
be su±cient to predict the direction of the next change, but if a wider
information set is superior, the usefulness of the Taylor rule as an ex
ante guide to monetary policymaking may be questioned. The paper
will determine whether it is possible to do better than a Taylor rule used
to predict the next rate change by extending the information set; it is
di®erent from the type of analysis proposed by Huang et al (2000) and
Orphanides (2000), where the Taylor rule is used to evaluate past deci-
sions on interest rate setting. The analysis is conductedon monthly data
for the United Kingdom which has been in°ation targeting since 1992.
The next section brie°y explains the conduct of monetary policy in the
United Kingdom over the period 1992-2001 and Section 3 estimates the
Taylor rule for this period. Section 4 explains the methodology of the
Multinomial Logit model, which is implemented in Section 5, for Taylor
rule information and for a wider information set. The out-of-sample
performance is assessed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Conduct of UK Monetary Policy
The responsibility for setting interest rates is currently held by the Mon-
etary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England. The Mon-
etary Policy Committee (MPC) has nine members: the Governor and
two Deputy Governors of the Bank of England; two `internal' Executive
Directors, responsible for monetary policy analysis and monetary policy
operations; and four `external' members appointed by the Chancellor of
the Exchequer with `knowledge or experience which is likely to be rele-
vant to the committee's functions'. Its responsibilities, operations and
procedures have been detailed by King (1997), Rodgers (1997) and Budd
(1998) but we review them brie°y here. The objectives of monetary
policy are set by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and are detailed in
the Bank of England Act 1998 as `(a) to maintain price stability and (b)
subject to that, to support the economic policy of Her Majesty's Gov-
ernment, including its objective for growth and employment'. The Bank
3has an operational target, currently de¯ned as 2
1
2 per cent for the under-
lying in°ation rate (RPI excluding mortgate interest payments), which
is reviewed annually by the Chancellor of Exchequer.
The MPC meets at least once a month, and the decision on the
o±cial interest rate is typically announced immediately after the meet-
ing, although it may postpone the announcement in order to intervene
in the ¯nancial markets. Before the decision is made, the MPC meets
for a whole day to be briefed by Bank sta® on the latest monetary pol-
icy developments. In addition, the MPC is provided with a range of
the Bank's monetary, economic, statistical and market expertise, sup-
plemented by intelligence from the Bank's network of twelve regional
Agencies (Rodgers, 1997). The presentations are given under the fol-
lowing headings: monetary conditions, demand and output, the labour
market, prices, and ¯nancial markets (Budd, 1998).
After the meeting, in order to promote the openness, the minutes
are published on Wednesday ofthe secondweek after the MPC's monthly
meeting. The minutes contain an account of the discussion of the MPC,
the issues that it thought important for its decisions and a record of
the voting of each MPC member (King, 1997). However, the minutes
do not attribute individual contributions to the discussion, because it
is thought that attribution would give a misleading indication of why
individual members of the MPC reached their decision, and may lead to
prepared statements.
Furthermore, a quarterly In°ation Report is published, whicho®ers
information on the prospects for future in°ation. Each Report reviews
the wide range of economic data needed to assess in°ation prospects over
the short to medium term, moreover, it also shows the forecast of the
in°ation with its probability distribution two years ahead, because it is
believed that the period of two years allows the monetary policy to have
the greatest e®ect on price level. The in°ation projection is published
in a fan chart, which requires the MPC to give its judgements not only
about the central tendency for in°ation but also about the variance and
skew of its probability distribution. The Bank publishes seperately the
minutes of the three preceding MPC meetings, and the three most recent
4press notices announcing the MPC's interest rate decisions. This is one
of the main instruments for accountability, allow the MPC to be assessed
and scrutinized by outside commentators (King, 1997).
Should the target be missed, the Governor is required to send an
open letter to the Chancellor if in°ation moves away from the target by
more than one percentage point in either direction. The letter will be
set out why in°ation has moved away from the target by more than one
percentage point; the policy actionbeing takentodeal withit; the period
within which in°ation is expected to return to the target; and how this
approach meets the Government's monetary policy objectives.
King (1997) stated that oneof themainpurposes of the open letters
is to explain why, in some circumstances, it would be wrong to try to
bring in°ation back to target too quickly. In other words, the MPC will
be forced to reveal in public its proposed reaction to large shocks. This
process involves considerable internal and external expertise, andrequires
the processing of a wide range of information and, where forecasts and
models are requiredof expected in°ation outcomes, good judgment. The
Taylor rule, by contrast, is a mechanical rule requiring only two pieces
of information, the in°ation rate and the output gap. In principle, as
McCallum (2000) has noted the monetary policy could be conducted by
a `clerk and a calculator', but to date we are not aware of any formal
testing of the predictive ability of the Taylor Rule.
3 The Taylor Rule
Taylor (1993) has suggested a simple rule by which the central bank
adjusts the nominal short-term interest rate. This re°ects movements
of a real interest rate, according to the deviation of the rate of in°ation




t = ¼t¡1 + ¯(¼t¡1 ¡ ¼
¤)+ °(yt¡1 ¡ y
¤)+ r + ´t (1)
5where ¼t is the annual in°ation rate (in the case of the United Kingdom
the Retail Price Index excluding mortgage interest payments, RPIX)2,
¼¤ is the in°ation target, r is the equilibrium real interest rate3 and
(yt¡1 ¡ y¤) is the output gap, and ´t is a serially uncorrelated random
error. The coe±cients ¯ and ° are the weights given to the deviation
of the in°ation rate from the target and the output gap respectively in
the monetary policy rule. It can be seen from equation (1) that the
current value of the nominal interest rate, it, depends on the previous
value of the output gap and the deviation of the in°ation rate from
target. The stochastic shock, ´t, is unknown at the time the central
bank sets the interest rate: this re°ects a realistic assumption about
the information available to the central bank at time t. Changes in the
policy instrument a®ect the economy withlags of approximately one year
to a®ect output, and two years to a®ect in°ation. We follow Clarida
et al (1998) who allow the central bank to operate a forward-looking
monetary policy in response to expected in°ation and output, rather than
lagged actual outcomes. In their paper, the modi¯cation has been made
assuming that withineach operating period the central bank has a target
for the nominal short-term interest rate, i¤




t = i +¯ (E[¼t+n j -t] ¡¼
¤) + °(E[yt j -t] ¡ y
¤
t) (2)
where i is the long-run equilibrium nominal rate, ¼t+n is the rate of
annualized in°ation n periods ahead, E is the mathematical expectation
operator and -t is the information available to the central bank at the
time it sets the interest rate. Equation (2) can be interpreted as the
rule by which central bank sets the target nominal short-term interest
rate given its future expectation about in°ation and output, based on
information available at the time it makes the decision. Rearranging
2This series is compiled using a large and representative selection of more than 600
goods and services for which price movements are regularly measured throughout the
country. The original source from the O±ce of National Statistic used 1987 as the
base year, however, in this paper the series are re-based using 1995 as the base year.
3In the Taylor rule this is a constant, but see Woodford (2001) for the case in
favour of a time varying interest rate equivalent to Wicksell's `natural rate'




t = r + (¯ ¡ 1)(E[¼t+n j -t] ¡ ¼¤)+ ° (E[yt j -t] ¡ y¤
t) (3)
where r is the long-run equilibrium real rate of interest. From equation
(3), the value of ¯ can be used in evaluating the aggressiveness of central
bank monetary policy to in°ation. If ¯ > 1, the target real rate adjusts
to stabilize in°ation and output (given ° > 0). With ¯ < 1, the interest
rate is then set to accomodate changes in in°ation. In the latter case,
self-ful¯lling bursts of in°ation and output may be possible.
In reality, the central bank may want to smooth changes in interest
rates. Conventional explanations for smoothing interest rate changes
include: fear ofdisrupting capital markets, loss of credibility from sudden
large policy reversals, the need for consensus building to support a policy
change, etc. (Goodhart, 1996 and Clarida et al, 1998). Thus we can
further assume that the actual rate partially adjusts to the target.
it = (1 ¡ ½)i¤
t + ½it¡1 +vt (4)
where vt is an exogenous random shock to the interest rate and the
parameter ½ 2 [0;1] captures the degree of interest rate smoothing. It
is also assumed that vt is i.i.d. De¯ne ® ´ i ¡¯¼¤ and e yt ´ yt ¡ y¤
t, we
then rewrite equation (2) as
i¤
t = ® +¯E[¼t+n j -t] + °E[e yt j -t] (5)
Combining the target model (5) with the partial adjustment mechanism
(4) yields
it = (1¡ ½)(® + ¯E[¼t+n j -t] + °E[e yt j -t])+ ½it¡1 + vt (6)
Finally, to obtain the estimated equation, eliminate the unobserved fore-
cast components from the expression by rearranging the policy rule in
terms of realized variables as follows:
7it = (1¡ ½)® +(1 ¡ ½)¯¼t+n + (1¡ ½)°e yt +½it¡1+ "t (7)
where "t ´ ¡(1¡½)f¯ (¼t+n ¡ E[¼t+n j -t])+ °(e yt ¡ E[e yt j -t])g+vt is
a linear combination of the forecast errors of in°ation and output and
the exogenous disturbance vt.
Most of the evidence o®ering support for the Taylor rule is esti-
mated for quarterly data (c.f. Clarida et al (1998), Taylor (1999)), how-
ever, Nelson (2000) has reported results for the UK using both quarterly
and monthly data. His results con¯rm that for the in°ation targeting
period 1992-1997 the equation (7) performs well on quarterly data. The
equation (7) can also reproduce the Taylor result using monthly data
from 1992/10 to 1997/04. The data set involves it measured by the
Treasury Bill rate, ¼t measured by the twelveth di®erence of the natu-
ral logarithm of the RPIX and e yt determined empirically by the resid-
uals from a 1971/01 to 1998/12 regression of the natarul logarithm of
the Index of Industrial Production. The estimation method is the In-
strumental Variable estimation and the set of instrument variables are
IV 2 (1;¼t¡1;:::;¼t¡6; e yt¡1;:::; e yt¡6;it¡1;:::;it¡6). With the value of n
= 3, his result is shown in the ¯rst row of Table 1. He found that the
long-run response coe±cient on in°ation, b ¯, equals 1:472 (0:424) and on
output gap, b °, equals 0:301(0:068). This result is remarkably close to
1:5 and 0:5 combination as suggestd by Taylor (1993).
Using Nelson's data4 we examine the robustness of the Taylor rule
at the monthly frequency using two di®erent measures of the interest
rate, two detrending methods to produce the output gap, and di®erent
instruments fortheestimationofthecoe±cients for comparison purposes.
The results, which take nothing away from Nelson's ¯nding that a Taylor
rule can be found for quarterly and monthly data at certain horizons,
show that at a monthly frequency - the frequency at which the Bank of
England currently sets the policy rate, the estimates are not robust.
Nelson's original model uses the rate from the thinly traded Trea-
sury Bill market as the dependent variable, while the actual policy rate
4We are very grateful to Edward Nelson for supplying us with his data set for
results comparison.
8is the rate on Gilt repurchase agreements (the repo rate). There may
be some advantages from using the Treasury Bill rate for a comparison
of di®erent policy regimes over the period 1970 - 1997, but we consider
how the results would change for the last regime if we used the repo rate
rather than the Treasury Bill rate. The comparison is found in the two
rows of Table 1. Using the Treasury Bill rate the coe±cients on in°ation
and output gap are closer to the Taylor rule coe±cients than if the Gilt
repo rate is used as the dependent variable. The use of the Gilt repo im-
proves the estimated value of the in°ation target5 from 3.65% to 2.88%
when estimated over the sample 1992/10 to 1997/04. The correlation
between the Treasury Bill rate and the Gilt repo rate is 0.88, and the
estimates are, perhaps unsurprisingly, relatively robust to changes in the
dependent variable.
The next step we take is to estimate the equation (7) using two
di®erent methods of detrending for the output gap. The sample period
in our estimation is between 1993/02, which is the starting month when
the Bank of England using the in°ation targeting, to 2000/12, giving 95
observations altogether. The variable it is the value of the Treasury Bill
rate or the Gilt repo rate, announced monthly by the Bank of England.
The variable ¼t is the 12-month (annualized) change in the price level,
using Retail Price Index excluding Mortgage Interest Payment (RPIX).
The Index of Industrial Production is used as a proxy for output and the
variable e yt, the output gap, is measured empirically by passing the value
of Index of Industrial Production from 1993/02 to 2000/12 through the
Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter. Because it is possible that the regressors in equa-
tion (7) dated later than period t may be correlated to the error term, "t,
so we use the method Instrumental Variable estimation in order to avoid
any endogeneity problems. The set of instrument variables are IV 2
(1;¼t¡1;:::;¼t¡6;¼t¡9;¼t¡12; e yt¡1;:::; e yt¡6; e yt¡9; e yt¡12;it¡1;:::;it¡6;it¡9;it¡12).
5The relationship ® ´ i ¡ ¯¼¤ and i = r + ¼¤; ® ´ r + (1 ¡ ¯)¼¤ allow us to
construct the estimate of the in°ation target, ¼¤, where
¼
¤ = (r ¡ ®)=(¯ ¡ 1) (8)
9We also consider a range of horizons for monetary policy, ranging from
three months (Nelson's horizon) to twenty four month (Batini and Hal-
dane (1999) andBatini et al (2001) note that ifmonetarypolicy is forward
looking in°ation should be replaced by expected in°ation. They suggest
a horizon of eighteen to twenty four months ahead). We consider the
performance of the equation for both the Treasury Bill rate and the Gilt
repo rate.
The results using the Treasury Bill rate as the dependent variable
and using the Gilt repo rate as the dependent variable are reported in
rows 1-10 and 11-20, respectively, in Table 2 for selected horizons (3, 6,
12, 18, 24), although we estimated the equation for all the horizons from
3 - 24 months. Using the Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter to detrend output we
found that, for both the Treasury Bill rate and the Gilt repo rate, the
estimate of the in°ation target was close to 2.5% for all horizons, but the
estimatedcoe±cients onin°ation and the output gap varied considerably
depending on the dependent variable and the forward-looking horizon.
In some cases the coe±cients were not signi¯cant, in others they were
signi¯cant but the wrongmagnitudes and evennegative. The high values
of the coe±cients in certain cases are due to the fact that the coe±cient
on the lagged dependent variable is often close to unity, in°ating the
calculated long-run values of the other coe±cients6.
We re-estimated the equation using a di®erent detrending method,
keeping all other features of the estimation procedure the same, the re-
sults using the Treasury Bill rate as the dependent variable and using
the Gilt repo rate as the dependent variable are reported in row 1-10
6It can be seen from equation (6) that a high value of ½ e®ectively puts great
weight on the lagged interest rate, and a low weight on the remaining variables. When
equation (7) is estimated, although the parameters on forward-looking in°ation and
the output gap are quite small, adjustment for the fact that small changes in the
instrument persist for a considerable time shows an aggressive response to expected
in°ation and output gaps. These variables a®ect future monetary policy as well
as the present, so the net response of the interest rate is considerable. Gradualist
policies such as these may con¯rm the observation of Ball (1999), who pointed out
that although in°ation targeters may want to bring in°ation back to target after a
shock they may not want to do so at the maximum speed, but they imply that the
e®ect of a change in rates is long lasting
10and 11-20, respectively, in Table 3. The Index of Industrial Production
is used as a proxy for output and the output gap, e yt, is measured em-
pirically by the residuals from a 1993/02 to 2000/12 regression of the
Index of Industrial Production on a quadratic trend (following Clarida
et al (1998) and Nelson (2000)). The results are dramatically di®erent
from the previous results. With a quadratic trend, the coe±cient on in-
°ation rate is wrongly signed for value of n = 3; the coe±cient values
are considerably di®erent from the Taylor rule values and are not always
signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. The estimated in°ation target is close
to 2.5 % when we use the Treasury Bill rate as the dependent variable,
but is not consistently estimated at values remotely close to 2.5% when
we use the Gilt repo rate. Again the coe±cient on the lagged dependent
variable is close to unity.
Finally, we altered the construction of the instrument set, reducing
theinstrumentsto IV 2 (1;¼t¡1;:::;¼t¡6;¼t¡9;¼t¡12; e yt¡1;:::; e yt¡6;it¡1;:::;it¡6);
the e®ecton the estimated in°ation targetandthe lagged dependent vari-
able is minor, but the estimated coe±cients on in°ation and the output
gap were highly variable and far from the Taylor rule predictions.
Two results seem to stand out as robust. First, the estimate of the
target in°ation rate seems, with a few exceptions to be estimated close
to the true target value of 2.5%, very close to its mean of 2.57% over the
sample. The second is the ¯nding that the smoothing parameter takes a
very high value for each of the horizons, n, which is consistent with the
smoothing hypothesis proposed by Goodhart (1996) and Sack (1997).
The estimated parameters re°ect the ¯ndings of other countries (e.g.
Clarida et al (1998) report values of ½ equal to 0.91, 0.93, 0.92, 0.95 and
0.95 for Germany, Japan, UK, France and Italy, respectively on monthly
data. Furthermore, Bernanke and Mihov (1997) report that the lagged
interest rate explains a very high proportion of the forecast variance of
the Lombard rate in Germany (96.5% at the one month horizon). This
result con¯rms that the Bank of England has had a very strong tendency
to smooth change in interest rates during this period, so that changes, if
they occur, are likely to be in the same direction rather than reversals.
Nevertheless, it is obvious that the estimation results can vary con-
11siderably according to the dependent variable, the detrending method
used for constructing the output gap, the forward-looking horizon, and
theinstrumentset. Only for thechoice of detrendingmethod, theforward-
looking horizon, and the instrument set used by Nelson (2000) do we ob-
tain the classical Taylor rule. Although we consider this to be a special
case, we use the Taylor rule for our subsequent tests of predictive perfor-
mance versus other information sets in within-sample and out-of-sample
exercises. In e®ect we ask whether in°ation and output are su±ce to
forecast the next change in the policy rate. In the next section, the
Taylor rule information set and an alternative information set based on
a wider category of information referred to in Section 2 will be compared
as predictors of the probability of the next change in the base rate.
4 The Multinomial Logit Model and the
Estimation of the Models
In many cases, especially when making a policy decision, analysts are
interested in predicting not only the level of interest rates, but also the
directional change of interest rates. The Taylor rule is an e®ective way
of summarising the behavior of the level of interest rates using the simple
information set (i.e. in°ation rate and output gap) which we refer to as
`Taylor rule information set'. In this section, we use the Multinomial
Logit model in order to investigate how useful the Taylorrule information
set is in forecasting the directional change of the base rate. In addition,
we select a di®erent information set that includes some macro variables
which might be more relevant to the decisionmaking process of the MPC
and compare those two information sets in terms of predictability power.
There are only three possible directions or categories that the base
rate can take: `down', `no change' and `up'. Accordingly we de¯ne a
random variable zt as follows:
zt = 0 if ¢it < 0;
zt = 1 if ¢ii = 0;
12zt = 2 if ¢it > 0
where ¢it = it ¡ it¡1. Let Xt represent an information set with k
variables. We always assume that the ¯rst element of Xt is one. In the
multinomial logit model, the probability of zt = 0;1 or 2 conditional on
a given information set Xt is de¯ned using the logit cumulative density
function:












and Pr(zt = 0 j Xt) = 1 ¡ Pr(zt = 1 j Xt) ¡ Pr(zt = 2 j Xt) where
¯1 and ¯2 are unknown k £ 1 parameters to be estimated. Then, the






1[zi = i]Pr(zt = i j Xt) (10)
where 1[¢] is the indicator function. The ML estimators ^ ¯1 and ^ ¯2 are
obtained by maximising the log-likelihood function in (10). We have
used LIMDEP to compute the ML estimators ^ ¯1 and ^ ¯2. Once we
have obtained ^ ¯1 and ^ ¯2, the predicted probabilities are obtained by
plugging ^ ¯1 and ^ ¯2 into the equations in (9) and we denote the predicted
probabilities ^ P0; ^ P1 and ^ P2. Our directional prediction ^ zt is then given
by
^ zt = m if ^ Pm = max( ^ P0; ^ P1; ^ P2): (11)
In other words, we predict `down' if ^ P0 = max(^ P0; ^ P1; ^ P2), `no change' if
^ P1 = max(^ P0; ^ P1; ^ P2) and `up' if ^ P2 = max(^ P0; ^ P1; ^ P2). It is worthnoting
that the statistical signi¯cance in the estimated coe±cients on the vari-
ables in ^ ¯1 and ^ ¯2 denotes its contribution to predictability. That is to
say the more signi¯cant the estimated coe±cient is, the more important
role it plays in calculating the respective probability.
Furthermore, in order to test for the overall signi¯cance of the es-
timation, we utilize the fact that, for any two models where one is the





= 2(lnLUR ¡ lnLR) » Â
2
q;® (12)
where q and® denotes the numbers of restrictions imposed and thesignif-
icance level, respectively. Thus both restricted and unrestricted model
are estimated7. Twice the di®erence between the log-likelihood function
of the two models has the Chi-squared distribution with q degrees of
freedom, and can be compared with the Chi-squared critical value. The
hypotheses for the test are
H0 : µj = 0 for j = 2;:::;q + 1
H1 : at least one µj 6= 0, for j = 2;:::;q +1
where µj is the jth parameter for the variable in the independent variable
vector, xt. In addition, the goodness-of-¯t can be measured by adopting
the McFadden method, the likelihood ratio index, which analogous to
the R2 in a conventional linear regression model
pseudo¡ R






4.1 The Multinomial Logit Model Estimation of the
Taylor Rule Information Set
First, we use the Taylor rule information set to predict the direction of
changeof thebase rate. Hence we set Xt = (1;¼t+12; ~ yt;it¡1)0 where ¼t+12
is the 12-month leaded rate of in°ation which allows for a reasonable
degree of forward-lookingness without limiting the degrees of freedom
excessively, ~ yt is the current value of output gap, and the variable it¡1 is
the 1-month lagged value of the base rate. The sample period is from
1993/03 to 1999/12. The total number of observations is 82.
7Restricted version of the model can be obtained by estimating the model with all
slope coe±cients set to zero.
14The logit estimation result is shown in Table 5. It is interesting to
¯nd that, contrary to the level regression, only the output gap appears
statistically signi¯cant which implies its ability to play a roll in the prob-
abilities prediction. The 1-month lagged value of base rate do not help in
predicting the directional change in the base rate. The p¡value for the
goodness-of-¯t Â2¡test is 0.091, so we barely reject the null hypothesis
that all coe±cients except the constant are jointly zero at the 10% sig-
ni¯cance level. The R2 is also very small, 0.07. Nonetheless, as pointed
out by Greene (1993), the coe±cients obtained from the Multinomial
Logit model are di±cult to interprete. It is also important to note that
the parameters estimated are not the marginal e®ects, like those of any
nonlinear regression model. In order to understand some economic intu-
itions from the estimation, we will investigate the marginal e®ects of the
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(14)
It is apparent that these marginal e®ects for each of the outcomes
will vary with the values of Xt. Therefore, it will be useful and conve-
nient to calculate their values at the means of the independent variables.
Table 6 illustrates the marginal e®ect of the characteristics on each prob-
abilities. It can be seen, for example, that at the mean values of the
in°ation rate and output gap, an increase in the value of both variables
will result in an increase in the probability that the base rate will rise
in the next period, b P2, but will lead to a decrease in the probability of
a falling interest rate, b P0. To be more precise, holding constant other
variables, a 1% increasing in the expected in°ation will increase the b P1
by 0:22% and decrease the b P0 and b P2 by 0:17% and 0:04%, respectively.
Furthermore, holding constant other variables, a 1% increasing in the
output gap will raise b P2 by 0:67% and lower b P0 and b P1 by approximately
0:007% and 0:06%, respectively. Since b P2 increases by more than the
other probabilities, b P0 and b P1, these will result in the tendency of the in-
terest rate to be raised in the subsequent period. These marginal e®ects
are calculated at the mean value of Xt and will be di®erent if calculated
15at other values of Xt.
Since we are interested in the predictability of a given information
set, we can also construct an outcome-based measure of the goodness-of-
¯t. In order to evaluate the proportion of correct predictions, one can
construct a cross-tabulation of predicted against observed outcomes or a
contingency table where we associate the direction of predicted changes
decided by (11) and the actual changes of the base rate. Table 7 shows
the contingency tablefor the Taylorrule informationset. Theproportion
of correct predictions denoted as SC is just sum of all diagonal terms






1(b zt = zt): (15)
The prediction using the Taylor rule information set always predicts no
change in the interest rate, except for one observation, where a falling
interest rate is correctly predicted. We found SC = 56
82, which suggests
that we have approximately 68% correct predictions. A close look at
the data allows us to see that the value of zt equals 1 most of the time,
which means that the dominant outcome is where there was no change in
the interest rate (the proportion is
56
57 = 98%). While in the state of the
rising interest rate and in the state of falling interest rate, there are no
correct predictions at all. Thus the overall proportion of the correct pre-
diction against actual outcomes mainly stems from the state where there
was nochange in the interest rate. Therefore, although the dominance of
correct predictions is encouraging, this in turn is due to the fact that \no
change"is the most common outcome. However, as pointed out correctly
by Bodie et al (1996), a high success rate generated by a \stopped-clock"
strategy is not goodevidence of predictability. For example, if youalways
predict `no rain' in San Diego, you may be right 95% of the time. The
measure SC in (15) cannot distinguish between seemingly successful pre-
dictability of a \stopped-clock" and true predictability. The technique
proposed by Merton (1981) can be straightforwardly applied to this situ-
ation. Let CPi be the proportion of the correct predictions when zt = i.
As we discussed earlier, we ¯nd that CP0 = 0
13;CP1 = 56
57 and CP1 = 0
12
16from Table 7; virtually no predictability when the base rate is falling and




[CP0 +CP1 +CP2 ¡ 1]
which is always between 0 and 1. For example, for a \stopped-clock"
strategy, only one of CPi's is equal to 0.98 and the other two CPi's are
zero. Hence, the correct measure CP is approximately zero indicating
that there is no predictability. On the other hand, for a perfect fore-
caster, all CPi's are equal to one and hence the correct measure CP
is one, revealing the correct status of perfect predictability. For the
Taylor rule information set, we ¯nd CP even becomes negative which
overules the apparent success rate of SC = 68% implying that the true
predictability of the Taylor rule information set can be very small.
4.2 The Multinomial Logit Model Estimation of the
Wide Information Set
We de¯ne a new independent variable vector for an alternative informa-
tion set, which will be refered to as the wide information set onward. It
is apparent from Section 2 that the interest rate setting process involves
a great deal more information than the Taylor rule variables. Each
month the monetary policy committee receives a brie¯ng from the Bank
sta® that gives attention to information arising from a range of other
sources. The contents of these meetings are summarised in the Bank
of England's publication, Minutes of the MPC Committee. In addi-
tion to these, the Bank produces a quarterly In°ation Report, which
contains chapters on money and ¯nancial markets; demand and out-
puts; the labour market; costs and prices; monetary policy since the
previous report; and the prospects for in°ation. The variables in the
wide information set were chosen to re°ect the extra information given
through these sources. In each case we had to use our judgement se-
lect a representative variable to capture a range of information. Our
selection included: the M4 money stock as an indicator of the in°ation-
ary pressure arising from monetary sources; the Sterling Exchange Rate
17Index to capture the e®ects of imported in°ation (e®ectively the com-
ponent of RPIX arising from sources other than domestic conditions);
the Average Earning Index represents the gauge of the labour market
as earnings put pressure on prices; and ¯nally, the Input Price Index8
to capture rising costs from other sources. These are in addition to
RPIX, our measure of in°ation, which we assume is still a central part
of the Bank of England's judgment, through the forecasting exercises
conducted internally. The wide information set is now a collection of
these new variables in addition to lagged RPIX, output gap and base
rate: Xt = (1;M4t¡1;EXt¡1;AEIt¡1;INPt¡1;RPIXt¡1; e yt;it¡1)0: The
variable M4t¡1 is the 1-month lagged value of the natural logarithm of
M4 money stock, EXt¡1 is the 1-month lagged value of the natural log-
arithm of Sterling Exchange Rate Index, AEIt¡1 is the 1-month lagged
value of the natural logarithm of Average Earnings Index, INPt¡1 is
the 1-month lagged value of the natural logarithm of Input Price Index,
RPIXt¡1 is the 1-month laggedvalue of the natural logarithm of RPIX9,
8The M4 is the broad de¯nition of the money stock, which comprises holdings by
the M4 private sector (i.e. private sector other than monetary ¯nancial institutions)
of notes and coin, together with their sterling deposits at monetary ¯nancial institu-
tions in the UK (including certi¯cates of deposit and other paper issued by monetary
¯nancial institutions of not more than 5 years original maturity).
TheSterling Exchange Rate Index is the Sterling exchange rate against a basket
of twenty currencies, monthly business-day averages of the mid-points between the
spot buying and selling rates for each currency as recorded by the Bank of England at
16.00 hours each day. They are not o±cial rates, but representative rates observed in
the London interbank market by the Bank's Foreign Exchange Dealers. Each of the
currencies' countries is given a competitiveness weight which re°ects that currency's
relative importance to UK trade in manufacturing based in 1989-1991 average aggre-
gate trade °ows. The original source from the Bank of England used 1990 as the
base year, however, in this paper the series are re-based using 1995 as the base year.
Average earnings are obtained by dividing the total paid by the total number of
employees paid, including those on strike. This series is of the whole economy,
seasonally adjusted, and use 1995 as the base year (1995=100).
The Input Price Index is the indices of input prices (material and fuel purchased)
for all manufacturing industry. This series are seasonally adjusted, and use 1995 as
the base year (1995=100).
9Here, we use the lagged value of the RPIX rather than the leaded value because
the out-of-sample prediction using the wide information set will be assessed in the
18e yt is our measure of output gap and it¡1 is the 1-month lagged value of
base rate. We also re-scales some of the variables by multiplying the
variablesM4t¡1;EXt¡1;AEIt¡1;INPt¡1 and RPIXt¡1 by 100in order to
get sensibles estimated coe±cients. The sample period is from 1993/03
to 1999/12, giving 82 observations altogether.
The estimation result is shown in Table 8. The result indicates
that the coe±cients for Sterling Exchange Rate Index and Input Price
Index are signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at least with 10% signi¯cant
level. These variables contribute in explaining the direction of change in
the base rate. Although the coe±cient of the 1-month lagged base rate
in the set of parameters ^ ¯1 is not statistically signi¯cant, it is so in the
set of parameters ^ ¯2 (see equation (9)). This means the lagged value of
base rate plays a part in predicting the state of rising interest rate but
not the state of a falling interest rate. The goodness-of-¯t Â2¡statistic
is 44.80 and hence we can reject the null hypothesis of the test for overall
signi¯canceofthe model at 5%signi¯cant level whichimplies that atleast
onevariable inthe model canexplain the probabilitiesofthe changeinthe
repo rate. The R2 for this wide information set approximately equals
0.37. This result indicates that there is a considerable improvement
in the goodness-of-¯t in this model from the previous model where the
Taylor rule information set is used in the estimation.
The marginal e®ects of the characteristics on each probabilities are
represented in the Table 9. Table 10 shows the contingency table of
predicted against observed outcomes for this wide information set. The
proportion of the correct prediction against the actual outcomes is SC =
62
82. Hence, approximately 76% of predictions are correct, with far more
variations in the prediction. The number of correct predictions against





57 and CP2 =
4
12, respectively. Therefore, the correct
measurefor thiswideinformationset is CP = 35%, which is substantially
higher than the previous case where the Taylor rule information set is
usedin the estimation. Another important considerationisthat there are
next section. It is a essential criterion to use only lagged values in the out-of-sample
prediction.
19no counter predictions, so the interest rate is never predictedto fall when
it rises or vice versa. These results indicate a substantial improvement
in the ability to predict the change in the interest rate from the model
where the Taylor rule information set is used as independent variables.
All the empirical results we have found so far strongly suggests
that the wide information set that is more relevant to the decision mak-
ing process of the MPC than the Taylor rule information set when used
to predict the directional change of the base rate. However, the em-
pirical fact that we can correctly predict the directional change of the
base rate 76% of the time and the correct measure CP is 35% is rather
surprising. Note that the actual outcomes are dominated by the state
of `no change' in the interest rate. Therefore, if one always predicts
that the interest rate will not change during his period of interest, his
prediction is likely to be impressively correct almost all of the times.
However, the other two states of outcomes, `falling' and `rising' that are
less likely to occur, ought to be taken into account in order to obtain the
correct measure of the prediction power. Here, in this case, the wide
information set when used to predict the direction of change in the base
rate, taken into account issue of the dominant state of `no change' out-
come, it can correctly predict 35% of the time. Of course, one can ask
whether or not these numbers can measure the true predictability of the
wide information set. This question should be answered because these
numbers have been obtained from in-sample estimation in that we have
in fact used future information when making predictions. Usually any
in-sample estimationis likely to leadto over-¯tting and, as aresult, tends
to overestimate true predictability. In the next section, we will carry
out an out{of-sample forecast exercise in order to answer the question.
205 The Out-of-Sample Prediction of the Change
in the Interest Rate: Taylor Rule Infor-
mation Set versus Wide Information Set
The objective of this section is then to make one-step-ahead predictions
of the directional change of the base rate, that is ^ zt+1; using the past and
current information available only up to time t. Once we have obtained
^ zt+1, then we move the current time to t + 1 and make one-step-ahead
predictions of ^ zt+2 using the information available only up to time t+1.
This process will be repeated until the last observation in the sample is
predicted. The initial estimation window is 1993/03 to the observation
1997/12 with 58 observations. The ¯rst prediction target date is 1998/1.
Given the small number of observations, we use an expanding window
method; that is, the ¯rst observation is ¯xed at 1993/03 while the esti-
mation window is expanding by one observation each time. Importantly,
in order to make this a true out-of-sample prediction, only lagged values
of the variables in each information sets will be used as predictors. We
will use the lagged value of in°ation rate (¼t¡1), output gap (e yt¡1) and
base rate (it¡1) in the out-of-sample prediction for the Taylor rule infor-
mation set and the lagged value of M4 money stock (M4t¡1), Sterling
Exchange Rate Index (EXCHt¡1), Average Earnings Index (AEIt¡1),
Input Price Index (INPt¡1) and Retail Price Index excluding mortgage
interest payments (RPIXt¡1) for the wide information set.
5.1 Forecasting the Change in the Interest Rate:
The Taylor Rule Information Set
From the second column Table 11, we found that although the actual
outcome varied, the Taylor rule information set predicts no change in
the interest rate in almost all out-of-sample observations. Table 12
shows the cross-tabulations of the predicted against observed outcomes.
From total 36 predictions test, there are only two observations, 1999/03
and 2000/03, where the Taylor Rule information set predicts fallings
21in the interest rate. Both predictions are incorrect, because the actual
outcomes were `no change'. For all remaining 34 observations, the Taylor
rule information set predicts `no change' in the interest rate. Out of
these 34 predictions, 22 are correct and 12 are incorrect. Therefore, the





which is 61 per cent. The evidence suggests that this ratio mainly stems
from the dominated `no change' outcome during the period of the out-
of-sample test. The Merton's measures for this out-of-sample exercise
using Taylor rule information set has a negative value which implies the
poor performance in predictability of the Taylor rule information set.
However, we note that we have used information in the detrenging
process that would not have been available to the central bank. To cor-
rect for this we detrend industrial production using the period from the
beginning of the sample tothe last observation before the date we wish to
forecast the change inthe interest rate. The result of the predictions out-
of-sample improves somewhat. There are now 23 out of 36 predictions
that are correct and these continue to fall within the `no change' cate-






which is 64 per cent up from 61 per cent previously.
5.2 Forecasting the Change in the Interest Rate:
The Wide Information Set
In forecasting the out-of-sample results for the wide information set we
included the new data to allow the model to predict by drawing on a
greater range of information. This has the advantage that the informa-
tion set nests the Taylor rule information, but in practice, we found that
better results were produced by excluding the output series than includ-
ing it. The third column of Table 11 shows the out-of-sample prediction
using the wide information set and Table 13 illustrates the contingency
table of the predicted against actual outcomes. The result is di®erent
from the previous case where the Taylor rule information set is used.
The wide information set predicts changes in the interest rate more often
than the Taylor Rule information set. The proportion of the correct pre-
22diction against the actual outcomes is SC =
24
36 = 67%. We found that
the higher value of the proportion of the correct prediction against the
actual outcomes does not result from the case where there was no change
in the interest rate which is the dominated state of outcome. The evi-
dence shows that the wide information predicts approximately the same
number of changes in the repo rate as the Taylor rule, but that it is more
capable of predicting positive and negative changes, especially during
the successive cut in rates from 1998/10-1999/4. When we calculated
the Merton's measures we found : CP0 = 5
7;CP1 = 17
24 and CP2 = 2
5
which implies that the correct measure from the out-of-sample exercise
is CP = 41%: This con¯rms a strong evidence for predictability. The
wide information set has the capability to predict the direction of change
in the interest rate. This result suggests that the wide information set
has a better record than the Taylor rule information because it can pre-
dict when a non-zero change should occur. A monetary policy maker
reliant on a Taylor rule would make a fewer changes to rates than one
that considered a wider information set. Figure 1 illustrates the interest
rate paths comparing the actual outcomes with the pridicted outcomes
using Taylor's rule information set and wide information set. We assume
here that if a change is predicted, the magnitude of the predicted change
is set to equal the actual size of change in that period. For example, in
1998/10, the wide information set predicted a falling in the interest rate,
since there were actually a 50 basis points cut in the repo rate, we then
set the size of predicted cut to 50 basis points too. It can be seen from
Figure 1 that the interest rate path predictedby the wide informationset
closely resembles the actual interest rate path, especially during 1998/09
to 2000/02. Finally, whether CP = 41% is signi¯cantly di®erent from
zero or not can be tested by the Â2¡independence test used in Schnader
and Stekler (1990) and Kolb and Stekler (1996), which will be illustrated
in the next section.
236 Test of Association in Contingency Ta-
bles
Although we found that the wide information set has greater ability to
predict the direction of change in the interest rate with more accuracy
than the Taylor rule information set, we may wonder whether the results
found arose by the actual ability to predict or simply just by chance. In
this section, we perform the so-called Test of Association in Contingency
Tables10. We want to test the following hypotheses.
H0 : No association between the predicted and the actual outcomes
H1 : There are associations between the predicted and the actual outcomes
Let Ri be the total for the ith row and Cj be the total for the
jthcolumn in Table 13. Then, the expected number of observations in
each entry, denote by b Eij, is de¯ned as b Eij =
RiCj
N where and N is the






(Nij ¡ b Eij)2
b Eij
where Nij is the frequency in the (i;j)th cell in the table. This statistic
is approximately distributed as Â2 random variable with 4 degrees of
freedom.
In the out-of-sample prediction for the Taylor rule information set,
the test cannot be performed, as there is no variation in the predictions
(results in zero denominator), but for the wide information set the cal-
culated statistic value equals 19:61, while the statistic Â2
4;0:05 equals 9:49.
Clearly, we can reject the null of no association, which implies that there
are associations between the predicted and the actual outcomes for the
10See Newbold (1995), p. 415-419
24wider information set. We can conclude that the ability to predict the
direction of change in the interest rate by the wide information set does
not arise by chance. The wide information set has the capability to
predict the direction of change in the interest rate.
7 Conclusion
A great deal of consensus has emerged in monetary policy making in the
1990s. The trinity of °exible exchange rates, in°ation targeting and the
empirical support for a Taylor rule have been central to this consensus.
This paper has sought to step back from the evidence in favour of the
Taylor rule as an ex post summary of sensible central bank behaviour in
order to ask whether the Taylor rule could be usefully used by a central
bank to predict the next change in interest rates. In other words, we
have asked whether the Taylor rule works as an ex ante monetary policy
making rule.
Using monthly data from the United Kingdom for the period of
in°ation targeting we ¯nd that the `Taylor rule' speci¯cation receives
less support than for quarterly data, a result consistent with monthly
evidence provided by Clarida et al (1998). In tests of Taylor rule in-
formation as a predictor of base rate change appears to predict well in
sample and out-of-sample, but on closer inspection we ¯nd that in both
cases, the 'no change' outcome dominates. We ¯nd that a wider set, that
includes monetary, exchange rate, labour market, and factor cost infor-
mation does better, in sample and out of sample. The Taylor predicts
that no change should take place far more often than the wider informa-
tion set, and a monetary policy maker relying on Taylor rule information
set would do far less than if a wider set of information were used to form
a judgment. Our conclusion is that the Taylor rule is less successful
as an ex ante predictor of monetary policy actions than it is as an ex
post summary of central bank behaviour. Parallel results, detailing the
shortcomings of the Taylor rule and variant of it for the ECB rate setting
process, draw similar conclusions (see Alesina et al (2001)). We agree
25withMcCallum (2000) andSvensson (2001) thatit is notpossible todele-
gate monetary policymakingtoa `clerk with a calculator', no matter how
wide the information set. This exercise shows that good performance as
an ex post summary of events does not imply good performance as an ex
ante predictor. The Monetary Policy Committee can sleep easy in their
beds, there is a role for policymakers who can form judgments about
monetary conditions and make changes accordingly. The rule may o®er
some useful guidance, but it will not replace them.
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Actual Taylor rule information set Wide information set
Figure 1: Comparison of the repo rate paths
Table 1: Taylor rule estimation results for Treasury Bill rate and Gilt
repo rate)
n b ½ d (1¡ ½)® d (1¡ ½)¯ b ¯ d (1 ¡ ½)° b ° ¼¤
3 0.579 0.007 0.620 1.472 0.127 0.301 3.65%
(0.091) (0.004) (0.263) (0.424) (0.031) (0.068)
3 0.609 0.005 0.655 1.675 0.083 0.213 2.88%
(0.076) (0.004) (0.230) (0.375) (0.021) (0.063)
29Table 2: Monthly estimates of the Taylor rule coe±cients using the
Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter
n b ½ d (1 ¡ ½)® d (1¡ ½)¯ b ¯ d (1 ¡ ½)° b ° ¼¤
3 0.904 0.241 0.129 1.356 0.168 1.761 2.08%
(0.048) (0.281) (0.136) (1.138) (0.070) (1.009)
6 0.898 0.203 0.163 1.593 0.148 1.444 2.18%
(0.045) (0.271) (0.118) (0.967) (0.067) (0.884)
12 0.926 -0.014 0.125 2.424 0.094 1.725 2.43%
(0.030) (0.320) (0.065) (1.743) (0.035) (1.280)
18 0.979 -0.435 0.220 10.405 0.074 3.479 2.53%
(0.046) (0.473) (0.107) (25.433) (0.073) (7.298)
24 0.970 -0.210 0.162 5.328 0.031 1.038 2.35%
(0077) (0.855) (0.170) (18.349) (0.086) (4.104)
3 0.949 -0.003 0.124 2.422 0.189 3.703 2.54%
(0.036) (0.217) (0.100) (1.665) (0.055) (2.826)
6 0.943 -0.093 0.175 3.080 0.186 3.283 2.50%
(0.033) (0.218) (0.087) (1.707) (0.056) (2.237)
12 0.982 -0.357 0.179 9.961 0.177 9.857 2.612
(0.028) (0.250) (0.073) (16.023) (0.054) (16.401)
18 1.030 -0.851 0.255 -8.357 0.149 -4.879 2.60%
(0.038) (0.407) (0.091) (9.320) (0.062) (6.701)
24 0.995 -0.174 0.083 15.497 0.120 22.336 2.48%
(0.055) (0.604) (0.116) (174.849) (0.071) (230.305)
The dependent variable is the Treasury Bill rate in the ¯rst ten rows and the Gilt
repo rate in the next ten rows.
For n = 3; the number of observations used in the estimation is 80 (from 1994/02
to 2000/09)
For n = 6; the number of observations used in the estimation is 77 (from 1994/02
to 2000/06)
For n = 12; the number of observations used in the estimation is 71 (from 1994/02
to 1999/12)
For n = 18; the number of observations used in the estimation is 65 (from 1994/02
to 1999/06)
For n = 24; the number of observations used in the estimation is 59 (from 1994/02
to 1998/12)
30Table 3: Monthly estimates for the Taylor rule coe±cients detrending
using a quadratic trend
n b ½ d (1 ¡ ½)® d (1¡ ½)¯ b ¯ d (1 ¡ ½)° b ° ¼¤
3 0.900 1.165 -0.257 -2.573 0.131 1.313 2.35%
(0.042) (0.396) (0.159) (2.132) (0.047) (0.685)
6 0.887 0.596 0.017 0.148 0.062 0.555 2.37%
(0.041) (0.441) (0.172) (1.523) (0.055) (0.498)
12 0.884 0.511 0.048 0.419 0.075 0.651 1.98%
(0.046) (0.471) (0.130) (1.199) (0.051) (0.348)
18 0.940 -0.040 0.138 2.300 0.053 0.879 7.66%
(0.063) (0.632) (0.134) (4.306) (0.051) (0.646)
24 0.967 -0.318 0.193 5.907 0.040 1.227 2.65%
(0.083) (0.883) (0.175) (19.548) (0.051) (2.875)
3 0.954 0.923 -0.288 -6.342 0.137 3.010 2.27%
(0.033) (0.303) (0.141) (6.642) (0.039) (2.506)
6 0.923 0.376 0.024 0.311 0.066 0.857 1.88%
(0.031) (0.332) (0.134) (1.716) (0.043) (0.638)
12 0.926 0.331 0.018 0.241 0.094 1.277 1.21%
(0.031) (0.331) (0.095) (1.325) (0.035) (0.521)
18 0.969 -0.163 0.106 3.442 0.084 2.718 3.61%
(0.042) (0.442) (0.096) (7.053) (0.032) (3.203)
24 0.956 0.082 0.042 0.975 0.089 2.035 -66.26%
(0.051) (0.566) (0.111) (3.513) (0.034) (2.397)
The dependent variable is the Treasury Bill rate in the ¯rst ten rows and the Gilt
repo rate in the next ten rows.
For n = 3; the number of observations used in the estimation is 80 (from 1994/02
to 2000/09)
For n = 6; the number of observations used in the estimation is 77 (from 1994/02
to 2000/06)
For n = 12; the number of observations used in the estimation is 71 (from 1994/02
to 1999/12)
For n = 18; the number of observations used in the estimation is 65 (from 1994/02
to 1999/06)
For n = 24; the number of observations used in the estimation is 59 (from 1994/02
to 1998/12)
31Table 4: Monthly estimates for the Taylor rule coe±cients using a di®er-
ent instrument set
n b ½ d (1 ¡ ½)® d (1¡ ½)¯ b ¯ d (1 ¡ ½)° b ° ¼¤
3 1.006 0.008 -0.328 53.336 0.035 -5.72 2.65%
(0.046) (0.003) (0.165) (379.050) (0.015) (41.370)
6 0.967 0.005 -0.114 -3.476 0.022 0.662 2.72%
(0.052) (0.004) (0.208) (11.249) (0.020) (1.540)
12 0.961 0.008 -0.211 -5.418 0.042 1.082 2.64%
(0.040) (0.006) (0.267) (10.596) (0.032) (1.652)
18 0.956 0.008 -0.207 -4.719 0.056 1.289 2.58%
(0.051) (0.011) (0.354) (5.814) (0.045) (1.183)
24 1.007 -0.004 0.153 -19.297 0.012 -1.573 2.54%
(0.081) (0.012) (0.312) (167.831) (0.037) (18.951)
The dependent variable is the Treasury Bill rate.
For n = 3; the number of observations used in the estimation is 86 (from 1993/08
to 2000/09)
For n = 6; the number of observations used in the estimation is 83 (from 1993/08
to 2000/06)
For n = 12; the number of observations used in the estimation is 77 (from 1993/08
to 1999/12)
For n = 18; the number of observations used in the estimation is 71 (from 1993/08
to 1999/06)
For n = 24; the number of observations used in the estimation is 65 (from 1993/08
to 1998/12)
32Table 5: The multinomial logit model estimation for Taylor rule infor-
mation set
Variable Coe±cient Standard Error b/S.E. Pr(jZj < z)
Set of parameters b ¯1
Constant -0.8874 3.8618 -0.230 0.8183
¼t+12 1.4592 1.0566 1.381 0.1673
e yt -0.0034 0.1777 -0.193 0.8466
it¡1 -0.1975 0.4306 -0.459 0.6465
Set of parameters b ¯2
Constant 2.0821 5.1798 0.402 0.6877
¼t+12 0.7939 1.4368 0.553 0.5806
e yt 0.6907 0.4085 1.691 0.0909
it¡1 -0.7502 0.6047 -1.241 0.2147
Dependent variable: zt; R2 : 0.07
Log likelihood function: -63.16523, Restricted log likelihood function: -67.73383
Chi-squared: 9.137206, Degrees of freedom: 6, Signi¯cance level: 0.1660075
33Table 6: The marginal e®ects of the characateristics vector for Taylor
rule information set
Variable Coe±cient Standard Error b/S.E. Pr(jZj < z)
Marginal E®ect on Pr(zt = 0)
Constant 0.0684 0.4964 0.138 0.8904
¼t+12 -0.1799 0.1630 -1.103 0.2700
e yt -0.0071 0.0232 -0.305 0.7600
it¡1 0.0346 0.0579 0.598 0.5496
Marginal E®ect on Pr(zt = 1)
Constant -0.3298 0.5991 -0.550 0.5820
¼t+12 0.2183 0.1612 1.354 0.1757
e yt -0.0596 0.0324 -1.839 0.0659
it¡1 0.0198 0.0671 0.296 0.7676
Marginal E®ect on Pr(zt = 2)
Constant 0.2614 0.4285 0.610 0.5419
¼t+12 -0.0384 0.1098 -0.350 0.7265
e yt 0.0667 0.0609 1.095 0.2736
it¡1 -0.0544 0.0589 -0.924 0.3557
Mean of ¼t+12 = 2:5242; e yt = ¡0:2074 and it¡1 = 6:1707
Table 7: The cross-tabulations of predicted against observed outcomes
Predicted
Actual 0 1 2 Total
0 0 13 0 13
1 0 56 1 57
2 0 12 0 12
Total 1 81 0 82
Result from the estimation of Taylor rule information set in the Multinomial Logit
model
34Table 8: The multinomial logit model estimation for wide information
set
Variable Coe±cient Standard Error b/S.E. Pr(jZj < z)
Set of parameters b ¯1
Constant -592.9578 298.0226 -1.990 0.0466
M4t¡1 0.0249 0.4211 0.059 0.9529
EXt¡1 0.8985 0.3291 2.730 0.0063
AEIt¡1 0.0633 0.7495 0.084 0.9327
INPt¡1 0.8277 0.3093 2.676 0.0075
RPIXt¡1 -0.5552 1.1625 -0.478 0.6329
e yt -0.3500 0.3684 -0.950 0.3421
it¡1 -0.8386 0.7066 -1.187 0.2353
Set of parameters b ¯2
Constant -932.3616 341.9809 -2.726 0.0064
M4t¡1 -0.6217 0.5465 -1.138 0.2553
EXt¡1 1.5301 0.4188 3.653 0.0003
AEIt¡1 -0.4588 0.8794 -0.522 0.6019
INPt¡1 1.2221 0.3703 3.300 0.0010
RPIXt¡1 1.5611 1.7765 0.879 0.3795
e yt 0.8940 0.7766 1.151 0.2497
it¡1 -2.7337 1.0796 -2.532 0.0113
Dependent variable: zt; R2 : 0.33
Log likelihood function: -42.40160, Restricted log likelihood function: -67.73383
Chi-squared: 50.66447, Degrees of freedom: 12, Signi¯cance level: 0.000005
35Table 9: The marginal e®ects of the characateristics vector for the wide
information set
Variable Coe±cient Standard Error b/S.E. Pr(jZj < z)
Marginal E®ect on Pr(zt = 0)
Constant 25.8819 32.1760 0.804 0.4212
M4t¡1 -0.0004 0.0183 -0.023 0.9820
EXt¡1 -0.0393 0.0453 -0.868 0.3854
AEIt¡1 -0.0022 0.0321 -0.068 0.9456
INPt¡1 -0.0360 0.0412 -0.876 0.3811
RPIXt¡1 0.0218 0.0595 0.365 0.7149
e yt 0.0138 0.0211 0.654 0.5134
it¡1 0.0380 0.0513 0.741 0.4586
Marginal E®ect on Pr(zt = 1)
Constant -17.7782 15.4042 -1.154 0.2485
M4t¡1 0.0147 0.0207 0.708 0.4793
EXt¡1 0.0245 0.0235 1.042 0.2974
AEIt¡1 0.0137 0.0352 0.0389 0.6975
INPt¡1 0.0265 0.0215 1.231 0.2185
RPIXt¡1 -0.0679 0.0618 -1.099 0.2716
e yt -0.0409 0.0277 -1.479 0.1391
it¡1 0.0047 0.0491 0.095 0.9240
Marginal E®ect on Pr(zt = 2)
Constant -8.1037 11.8410 -0.684 0.4937
M4t¡1 -0.0143 0.0226 -0.631 0.5282
EXt¡1 0.0149 0.0213 0.698 0.4854
AEIt¡1 -0.0115 0.0195 -0.589 0.5560
INPt¡1 0.0096 0.0140 0.682 0.4952
RPIXt¡1 0.0462 0.0749 0.617 0.5372
e yt 0.0271 0.0437 0.621 0.5343
it¡1 -0.0427 0.0621 -0.688 0.4912
Mean of M4t¡1 = 1338:52, EXt¡1 = 470:26, AEIt¡1 = 465:01,
INPt¡1 = 450:91, RPIXt¡1 = 463:29, e yt = 0:2074 and it¡1 = 6:1707
36Table 10: The cross-tabulations of predicted against observed outcomes
Predicted
Actual 0 1 2 Total
0 6 7 0 13
1 2 52 3 57
2 0 8 4 12
Total 8 67 7 82
Result from the estimation of wide information set in the Multinomial Logit model
Table 11: The out-of-sample prediction result
Observation Actual T W Observation Actual T W
1998/01 1 1 2 1999/07 1 1 1
1998/02 1 1 2 1999/08 1 1 1
1998/03 1 1 1 1999/09 1 1 1
1998/04 1 1 1 1999/10 2 1 1
1998/05 1 1 1 1999/11 1 1 1
1998/06 2 1 1 1999/12 2 1 1
1998/07 1 1 1 2000/01 2 1 2
1998/08 1 1 1 2000/02 2 1 2
1998/09 1 1 1 2000/03 1 0 2
1998/10 0 1 1 2000/04 1 1 2
1998/11 0 1 0 2000/05 1 1 2
1998/12 0 1 0 2000/06 1 1 2
1999/01 0 1 0 2000/07 1 1 1
1999/02 0 1 0 2000/08 1 1 1
1999/03 1 0 0 2000/09 1 1 1
1999/04 0 1 0 2000/10 1 1 1
1999/05 1 1 1 2000/11 1 1 1
1999/06 0 1 1 2000/12 1 1 1
T: using the Taylor rule infomration set as predictors
W: using the wide information set as predictors
37Table 12: The cross-tabulations of predicted against observed outcomes
Predicted
Actual 0 1 2 Total
0 0 7 0 7
1 2 22 0 24
2 0 5 0 5
Total 2 34 0 36
Result from the out-of-sample prediction of the Taylor rule information set
Table 13: The cross-tabulations of predicted against observed outcomes
Predicted
Actual 0 1 2 Total
0 5 2 0 7
1 1 17 6 24
2 0 3 2 5
Total 6 22 8 36
Result from the out-of-sample prediction of the wide information set
38